If I was the most important element of the landscape, if everything revolved around me, then the growth of blanket weed in the canal, the fading paint on the narrowboats and the additions of graffiti on the underpass would have been measured to quantify my absence. The St. George flags on the new canalside apartments would be there to celebrate my slain dragon. But none of these things were the case so we were free to just walk and notice: meadows visible through the hedges; a heron, with a whole fish in its neck; features of rail and canal architecture collapsing into the natural environment; empty chairs at the back of a factory. (Bayfield 2016: 22)
I admire the way he combines magick, art and spirituality. The book is a nexus of all three. This passage shows how he achieves it: a delicious letting-go of any sensible, central I.
It is because none of us is at the centre that we really are free. Things are never more themselves when unmeasured in relation to us. Letting drop the urge to find ourselves in everything is a hallmark not just of psychological maturity, good poetry, and meditative practice, but also – evidently – of Bayfield’s unique flavour of psychogeography.
Accompanying him in his enchantments of meaning from space and place is a vicarious and intense magickal pleasure.
Gordon White is now a major influence within chaos magick. I recently finished reading his latest book, The Chaos Protocols: Magical Technicques for Navigating the New Economic Reality.
It does not happen often, but I was offended by this book. Most of all, by the part where White presents a version of The Bornless Ritual (cannily retitled ‘The Headless Rite’.)
I have no problems with the ritual. However, White suggests that, consequent to its performance, â€œfamily-owned houses have sold for over a million dollarsâ€ and â€œI have had […] job offers from out of the blue without even an interview, from the worldâ€™s most desirable companyâ€ (White 2016: 72).
In western magick, the Bornless Ritual has been used to protect Goetic magickians from harm. It has also been employed to invoke the â€œholy guardian angelâ€. But White appears to regard it as a suitable vehicle for wealth magick (73).
There was much in the book I found inspiring, particularly the analysis of the world economic situation. But, despite admiring Whiteâ€™s genuinely devastating portrayal of how â€˜the rules of this world were simply not built for your benefitâ€™ (6), I deplore his proposed solution. And I have been puzzling ever since over the offence that this style of chaos magick provokes in me.
Offence stems generally from holding beliefs too rigidly. So what justification have I, as a supposedly belief-shifting chaos magickian, admitting to an experience of offence? I hold the view that the importance we place on the results of our magick reveals something about our nature. Yet White regards as a â€œdangerous illusionâ€ (54) the perspective that magick is a teleological or developmental process. His view is that we do not and cannot know what we really want (our â€˜True Willâ€™) because no such thing exists.
Despite forgoing the notion of will, this seems a fundamentally Nietzschean moral outlook. It is indeed an enlivening critique of the sadly compliant muggle who assumes the good life is attained merely from obeying societal rules. However, â€œthe lifeâ€™s work of a chaos magicianâ€, concludes White, is â€œfine-tuning probabilistic dials for fun and profitâ€ (136), which (to anyone who has seen The Wolf of Wall Street) might sound more like a memoir of a stockbroker than a mage.
White assumes a disparity of wealth between himself and his reader. â€œ[Y]ou would not be reading this book because you would already be wealthyâ€, he jibes at one point, although he credits that I might â€œbe reading it on the deck of your super-yacht in Croatiaâ€ (135). In the course of dispensing further careers advice, he proffers: â€œwhich option has even the tiniest chance of you owning a network of old folks homes and retiring to a private island?â€ (165), as if this were a self-evidently laudable aim.
Is this really a book about chaos magick? Maybe it is, because Whiteâ€™s tone perhaps reminds us of the kind of political opinions that Peter Carroll frequently expresses on his blog. (Carroll must despair of the leftist, socially-conscious and wealth-indifferent folk who â€“ in my experience â€“ form the majority of those involved in the contemporary chaos current.) Yet, unlike Carroll, White seems a little uncomfortable with his own views. At one point he laments: â€œno one explains to you how difficult it is to demonstrate enough personal success to justify taking up the readerâ€™s time without sounding like an appalling person in the processâ€ (179).
Maybe this was an insight that should have given him greater pause for thought because, evidently, like most, White wants to be a good person. To be seen as good implies that goodness is indeed something that others recognise and share. â€œ[T]he fundamental form of human relationshipâ€, writes Alasdair MacIntyre, following Aristotle, â€œis in terms of shared goods. The egoist is […] always someone who has made a fundamental mistake about where his own good lies and someone who has thus and to that extent excluded himself from human relationshipsâ€ (MacIntyre 1985: 229).
One of the most pernicious effects of globalised capitalism is its atomisation of society. Whatever the latest technology, convenience or working practice, it seems always at the expense of human relationships. White wants to dance his own dance, and yet it seems to be very much to capitalismâ€™s tune.
White strongly advises the magickian to uproot from his or her community and follow the money: â€œRefusing to move is taking the position that you will make do with the reduced or entirely absent opportunities in the area where you currently liveâ€ (White 2016: 163). Rather than finding ways to develop honest and direct relationships with others (and with ourselves), he advises: â€œyou will need to be very good at compartmentalisationâ€ (169), and to deal with the psychological consequences of this alienation: â€œIf you want to complain about people, get a therapistâ€ (169). While some might regard this as the chaos magickian bucking the system, it looks suspiciously to me like self-centred quietism. I can hear capitalism laughing at us… Or, at least, I think it is capitalism that I hear…
Whiteâ€™s fundamental egotistical mistake is perhaps due to the underlying magickal model he adopts in the book: the deal with the devil (or trickster). â€œYou will get nowhere in magic or in lifeâ€, he suggests, â€œwithout a robust relationship with the Lord of the Crossroadsâ€ (106). Yet, ever since Doctor Faustus, it is clear that anyone who enters into such a deal loses their soul. As in goetic workings, where the magickian expects to be screwed if the spirits are given leeway, so the signatory of the midnight crossroads pact must recognise that their soul is necessarily forfeit. This is simply the consequence of entering into that magickal model.
But I suspect that, in his rejection of the concept of â€œTrue Willâ€, White assumes he has no soul in the first place to lose. However, this exempts no one from the conditions of that magickal model. This is the error, I think, that accounts for the ethical vacuity of The Chaos Protocols, despite its perspicacity in so many other respects.
Either White assumes that his soul is not worth saving, or by assuming he has none to lose he is attempting playing a trick on the trickster, and in the process identifying with that from which he hoped to extract a bargain. But in this way he simply swindles himself; he ends up doing the devilâ€™s work, instead of the devil doing his.
This was the source of my offence, I realised: the lack of importance placed on the development of the soul. If that really plays no part in chaos magick, then neither can I.
MacIntyre, Alasdair (1985). After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory. Second edition. London: Duckworth.
White, Gordon (2016). The Chaos Protocols: Magical Techniques for Navigating the New Economic Reality. Woodbury, MN: Llewellyn.
Jung understood the rise of Nazism in terms of the emergence of an archetype: the god Wotan (Jung 1970).
At a seminar where this was discussed a skeptical participant enquired, â€œIf Wotan was responsible then where was he?â€
â€œHe was simply in the air at that time, in the landscape, the rivers, the trees,â€ another participant answered.
â€œBut the trees and rivers didnâ€™t join the Nazi party,â€ the skeptic rejoined.
The skeptic’s error is to suppose that archetypes provide a causal explanation. Of course, they do not. But they may illuminate the reasons for events, because whereas causes reside in material reality, reasons lie within the reality of human understanding.
What can offer a more convenient means for apprehending huge-scale shifts in behaviours and attitudes than the notion of a god? So in this sense, I propose, we are in the grip of an archetype at least as strong and malevolent as Wotan. Presently we are governed by the acolytes and ideology of Cronos, that baleful deity who passes also by the name Saturn, and his associated images of Old Father Time and the Grim Reaper.
Cronos was the son of the first god, Uranus, himself the son of Chaos and Mother Earth. The first distinctive act of Cronos was to depose his father by castrating him. Yet after assuming power it was prophesied that Cronos would also be deposed by his son. To maintain his position, Cronos ate his children as soon as they were born. The tactic served him well until the birth of Zeus, for whom a stone was substituted that Cronos unwittingly ate instead. Zeus was raised in secret and, when fully grown, administered a potion to Cronos that made him vomit up all the brothers and sisters he had swallowed.
Perhaps there is a specific prophecy in the version of the myth penned by Robert Graves, wherein Cronos and his supporters are â€œbanished to a British island in the farthest westâ€ (Graves 1992: 40). The enduring presence of Cronos in this part of the world might account (non-causally) for why we live in times of such acute anxiety regarding those who prey upon children.
Prominent politicians and figures in the entertainment industry have been exposed as prolific abusers of children. We are tormented by a suspicion that this abuse could be endemic, perhaps institutionalised within the highest strata of our society. Yet the serial resignations of the Chairs of the Independent Enquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (2016), the non-government enquiry set up to investigate these claims, suggests also a curious powerlessness to expose the truth.
Additionally, our economy perpetuates exploitation of the young (Elliott 2016). They have lost the free access to education and stable employment enjoyed by older generations, who â€“ whilst living ever longer â€“ augment their share of wealth at the younger generationâ€™s expense.
The distinguishing trait of Cronos is his grip on the present by retarding and denying both life and power to whatever might dare to succeed him. We see this attitude also in corporations that cling to profits even whilst cognizant of the harm they do, and even when in possession of means to act more benevolently. The manufacturers of excessively sugary foods are acolytes of Cronos. So too, the fracking industry, which clings to fossil-fuels, denying the ascendancy of renewable energy sources.
There is justification for conservation of the current good. Sustaining the present can provide stability and peace. But Cronos personifies how this slips into tyranny when the ruling order perpetuates itself purely on the basis that that is what it is. No longer is this conservation, but instead the prevention of the future from being born.
The gods interact with but transcend the psychological realm. The machinations of Cronos are visible in the economy, politics and culture. Yet Cronos is what he is, and is not any of the manifestations of himself. We cannot ask why Cronos is this way, because in the nature of a god is no gap, unlike the gap that intervenes in human experience between our consciousness and nature.
Cronos simply is, but for a human being to become his acolyte requires an alienation from nature, one that supplants the protection and honouring of our future and offspring with a desire to despoil, exploit and limit. Cronos is pervasive because he slips easily into the consensus. We assume there must be good reasons for things being the way they are. The way things are is what feels normal. But what if the reasons for normality are really not good ones at all? If only a few reap the full benefit from things the way they are, can that be a good reason? If not, then what is normal is irrational and sick. The myth of Cronos is the violence and madness that can come to underpin the semblance of normality.
The psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas was the first to identify what he called â€˜normoticâ€™ illness, which â€œis typified by the numbing and eventual erasure of subjectivity in favour of a self that is conceived as a material object among other man-made products in the object worldâ€ (Bollas 1987: 135). Such a person is â€œsomeone who is abnormally normal. He is too stable, secure, comfortable and socially extrovert. He is fundamentally disinterested in subjective lifeâ€ (136). The normotic personality â€œis alive in a world of meaningless plentyâ€ (137).
The normotic is an acolyte of Cronos because his flight from nature, from his soul, is underpinned by the dominant discourse, materialism, which avers that we are exclusively physical organisms, separately adrift in a meaningless universe. This is considered a normal way of looking at life. But no one could give this idea credence, and it would not have required the acumen of Bollas to sniff out the normoticâ€™s pathology, were it not for the fact that so many already believe in and shore up this view.
Cronosâ€™s dead hand is evident also in Bollasâ€™s account of how a normotic individual is created by a parent systematically disowning the subjective, imaginative nature of their child. Where this succeeds it is because both parties are disposed to becoming normotic, which causes Bollas to speculate whether â€œthe childâ€™s disposition to be emptied of self reflects his own death driveâ€ (143). The death drive is a nebulous and controversial notion. An understanding of it might be gained from looking up the meaning of Saturn in western occultism (Uâˆ´Dâˆ´ 2005: 114) just as much as from reading Freud. But, in any case, Bollas describes how: â€œParent and child organize a foreclosure of human mentality. They find a certain intimacy in shutting down life togetherâ€ (143).
The creation of a normotic individual entails a type of abuse that hides its perversion behind a guise of normality. The normotic parent creates a normotic child by taking Cronos as a role model and consuming the childâ€™s soul before that soul can be born. Bollas remarks how: â€œIt is indeed striking how this [normotic] person seems to be unborn. It is as if the final stages of psychological birth were not achieved and one is left with a deficiency [â€¦ in] that originating subjectivity which informs our use of the symbolicâ€ (140-1). Without either soul or the capacity to use symbols, the normotic becomes the antithesis of a practitioner of magick.
Sermons to the Unborn was a title that sprang fully-formed from the mind of Bonhomme. At the time it sounded right, but I feel I am only now beginning to understand why. Our sermons on this blog are addressed to the unborn, the acolytes of Cronos. And our impossible mission is to preach to those least equipped to hear.
Bollas, C. (1987). The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known. London: Free Association Books.
In The Spell of the Sensuous (1997) ecologist and philosopher David Abram examines how our minds have become severed from sensory experience, and â€“ consequently â€“ our bodies disconnected from the natural world.
The blame for our current ecological plight he allocates predominantly to alphabetic writing, which destroyed the link between meaning and its basis in our physical participation in the processes and qualities of the natural world.
When linguistic signs become based on arbitrary vocal sounds (in contrast to pictographic symbols), then: â€œthe larger, more-than-human life-world is no longer a part of the semiotic, no longer a necessary part of the systemâ€ (1997: 101). Consequently,
our organic attunement to the local earth is thwarted by our ever-increasing intercourse with our own signs […] Human awareness folds in upon itself, and the senses […] become mere adjuncts of an isolate and abstract mind bent on overcoming an organic reality that now seems disturbingly aloof and arbitrary. (1997: 267)
Specifically, it was the ancient Greeks who led us into this sorry state. â€œSocrates forced his interlocutors to separate themselves, for the first time, from their own wordsâ€ (1997: 109). Myths and stories formerly provided a union with nature, which Plato’s writings undermined and destroyed. In an oral culture, a term such as â€œJusticeâ€ always has a context: it is expressed in stories as a specific occurrence, as an event that actually took place. Yet â€œSocrates attempts to induce a reflection upon the quality as it exists in itselfâ€ (1997: 111), and so we arrive â€“ via Plato â€“ at the sense of Justice as a thing-in-itself, an abstract entity with an existence somehow independent from the physical world. There is now scope for belief in a realm of ideas separate from nature, and Abram’s complaint is that we have become increasingly lost in this Platonic invention.
Abram’s book has been influential. His evocation of the role of sensation and perception in human cognition is powerful and compelling. He offers a philosophical foundation for shamanistic and ecological magicks. Yet I am troubled by his demonisation of Platonism, and his privileging of the body and nature above soul and intellect.
If, as Abram suggests, the invention of phonetic writing sealed us within a world of human signs, excluding the other in the body, in non-human species and the natural environment, then our conception of soul or spirit is a harmful, autistic delusion.
However, surely by coincidence, the very next book I read after Abram’s makes a similar but opposite argument. In The Primitive Edge of Experience (2004), psychoanalyst Thomas Ogden writes of a basic mode of human experiencing that he names â€œthe autistic-contiguous positionâ€:
Sequences, symmetries, periodicity, skin-to-skin â€œmoldingâ€ are all examples of contiguities that are the ingredients out of which the beginnings of rudimentary self-experience arise. (2004: 32)
The elements of this level of experience, which first appears in early infancy, are perceptual sensations of bodily contact, hardness or softness, being rocked, rhythms of appearances and disappearances, all of which: â€œhave nothing to do with the representation of one’s affective states, either idiographically or fully symbolically. The sensory experience is the infantâ€ (2004: 35).
Yet whereas Ogden concurs with Abram that the use of language or symbolisation detracts from experience at this autistic-contiguous level, in Ogden it lacks the Edenic quality evoked by Abram’s writing. For Ogden, the autistic-contiguous is â€œpreparatory for the creation of symbolsâ€ (2004: 59), and to dwell exclusively within it presents a dilemma of becoming â€œentrapped in sensory experienceâ€ (2004: 78). For Abram, the sensory is primary and language is an autistic detraction. For Ogden, sensation attracts the label of â€œautismâ€, yet without any sense of pathology, because this type of non-reflective experience provides an essential â€œbounded sensory ‘floor’ […] of experienceâ€ (2004: 45), â€œthe beginnings of qualities of who one isâ€ (2004: 54).
For Abram, the turning in upon human signs results in alienation from the body. But for Ogden, the turning in upon sensory experience results in a basic sense of self on top of which further maturational developments may accrue. Both writers are exploring similar territory, but from opposing points of view. Placing these authors beside one another, perhaps we start to see how this â€œautismâ€, the reflexive turning in upon oneself, is perhaps not by definition detrimental. And perhaps neither is sensation or symbolisation necessarily malign or benign. Increasingly, it may seem that we are labouring beneath a false opposition between the body and spirit.
Abram himself recognises a flaw in his privileging of the sensory and those indigenous means of apprehending the world that are deeply rooted in it. â€œIf our primordial experience is inherently animistic,â€ he wonders, â€œhow can we ever account for the loss of such animateness from the world around us?â€ (1997: 90). The argument that x is our primary mode of being, but that x has been forgotten, contains a glaring contradiction that the forgetting of x is evidently more primary than x itself. In that case, perhaps the ecological crisis is not a consequence of the invention of writing so much as the forgetting of nature because our (even more) primary mode of being is, perhaps, forgetfulness. Indeed, for Ogden, the autistic-contiguous is a â€œpositionâ€ (2004: 11), a kind of stance or attitude that may be lost, or into which we may fall at any time, if more sophisticated levels of being are placed under stress. Our fundamental mode of being is maybe neither sensory nor cognitive, neither bodily nor spiritual. Perhaps our fundamental mode of being consists in not having a fundamental mode of being.
Enlightenment traditions present themselves as the antidote to habitual forgetfulness. Techniques for realising the absence of a fundamental self rely on cultivating a turning inwards, a kind of intentional autism that contrasts with the reactive type that both Abram and Ogden evoke. Within enlightenment traditions, it does not appear to matter what the objects of that turning inwards might be, whether sensations, thoughts or meritorious actions. The intention is to realise how whatever fills experience is not fundamentally what we are, because it is not invulnerable to forgetting.
Applying this to magickal practice, my view is that magick is wherever we find it. There are body magicks and shamanistic nature magicks. But there are also word and number magicks, and magicks of abstract contemplation. They are not of equal value, but neither is one of them necessarily of greater value than all the rest.
Recently, I read up onÂ hygienic macros in functional programming languages. (Unless you are into very geeky details of computer science, you do not have to follow that link.) Thought processes diverged and branched out and recombined, and I present you with the resulting definition of Hygienic Magic:
Hygienic MagicÂ is magic whose working is guaranteed not to cause the accidental capture of mental identifications.
To further parody the Wikipedia article I linked: The general problem of accidental capture is well known within the magical community. Magicians will use banishing rituals and dedicated temple spaces to defineÂ the location and duration of a ritual, and to remove any residual, unwanted identifications, for example after invoking an entity.
In other words, most formal, ceremonial magical acts are hygienic.
So what about the everyday intentional, magicalÂ acts where we do not set up a temple and banish thoroughly before and after? Should we be worried about contracting astral diseases off door handles? Should we expectÂ demons behind every street corner ready to possess us? Will we ourselves become vehicles of contagion?
No. But there is a class of intentional acts which carry a high possibility of capturing mental identifications: reading or otherwise accessing or interacting with information. To a degree, the new identifications are desired and expected: by reading a book on Chaos Magic, I want to identify with being someone who knows more about the subject.
What if the book carries other, less overt information suitable for identification? By reading a text by Julius Evola for example, I will also be exposed to his latent fascism and appreciationÂ of the naziÂ “order” of the SS. WillÂ this turnÂ me into a reactionary genocidal black brother? Not immediately, I am sure. And maybe not in the long term either, depending on my other identifications and preferences. I already know that the author had ideological affiliations which I reject, so I will be alert and my magical act of intentionally reading Evola will likely be a hygienic one.
How about readingÂ Peter Carroll’s blog, an influential writer who isÂ very competent in magicÂ but whose political leanings were not previously on my mental radar? Are the identitarian overtonesÂ which I encounter there worthy of my consideration because I am so used to having my preconceived notions about reality challenged by this magician, or are they just more of the murky banality of the dark enlightenment? Or did Peter Carroll himself neglect hygiene by picking up this stray right-wing identification? And of course, questions like these should arise in me not only when accessing texts by magical writers, but when interacting with any information in general.
Unfortunately, I know of noÂ simple banishing ritual that will wipe away all traces of accidentally captured identifications.Â It is tempting to believe that wearing a suitable sigilÂ or chanting a certain mantra will give me the magical equivalent of a condom protecting me from the exchange of fluids and energies during intellectual intercourse, but I am convinced that nothing short of a personal transformation into being more watchful and critical – andÂ hygienicÂ – in the everyday magical act of consuming information is necessary.
â€œThe Monkeyâ€™s Pawâ€ (1902) is a supernatural tale of suspense written by W.W. Jacobs. And monkeyspawed is a slang-term Iâ€™ve heard, used by magickians to describe a particular way in which magick can rebound.
For instance, Boffo and I monkeyspawed ourselves handsomely in a recent working. I had been suffering from recurrent headaches and devised a ritual to balance my ajna chakra. Boffo was assisting, so I broadened the intention to include him. â€œIt is our will,â€ we declared at the beginning of the ritual, â€œto balance our ajna chakrasâ€.
It was a couple of weeks, and required the acumen of a third party, before we arrived at an explanation of the puzzling outcome of the working, because, the next day, I had my usual headache (although not quite as bad as usual) and Boffo had one as well. So we had indeed â€œbalancedâ€ our ajna chakras, in the sense that Boffoâ€™s ajna chakra had been rendered as equally fucked-up as mine.
The paw in Jacobsâ€™ tale is a dried-up talisman with the power to grant three wishes, but it has left a trail of unhappiness. Its magick, we are informed, comes from a holy fakir who placed a spell upon it because: â€œHe wanted to show that fate ruled peopleâ€™s lives, and that those who interfered with it did so to their sorrowâ€. The hero of the tale, Mr. White, wishes for some cash to pay off his mortgage, only to receive the sum he requested as compensation for his sonâ€™s death in an industrial accident. Distraught with grief, Mrs. White persuades her husband to wish for the return of their son, and later that night knocking is heard at their door. Mr. White identified their sonâ€™s body, saw how badly mutilated he was by the accident, and canâ€™t prevent himself from thinking how being buried for the past ten days might not have improved matters. And so White deploys the remaining wish, just as his wife flings open the door and â€“ to Mr. Whiteâ€™s relief â€“ discovers no one is there: â€œA cold wind rushed up the staircase, and a long loud wail of disappointment and misery…â€
However, the lesson of â€œThe Monkeyâ€™s Pawâ€ cannot be simply that magick is evil or inevitably produces harm, because the fakir who made the spell is described as â€œa very holy manâ€, and his magick (unlike Whiteâ€™s) is successful in realising its purpose. Yet the demonstration of the fakirâ€™s teaching is made at the expense of others who fail to see in advance that by using the paw and asserting their own desire, they are in fact subjecting themselves to someone elseâ€™s will.
Is it not odd that a morality tale highlighting the inadequacy of individual will should hinge so crucially upon language? â€œGetting monkeyspawedâ€ usually implies a magickal intention that is verbally incomplete or ambiguously worded, as in the example of Boffo and I screwing ourselves over with the word â€œbalanceâ€. Wiccans habitually append the expression â€œan it harm noneâ€ onto their magickal intentions, and it might be supposed that if Mr. White had taken this simple measure it would have protected him from much distress, or at least have posed a greater challenge to the fakirâ€™s intentions. Yet the Wiccans, sweet as they may be, are really only hedging the issue, because identifying what we donâ€™t want to happen (i.e. harm) has always been easier than ascertaining and taking responsibility for our true desire.
And is it not equally odd how the notions of imposing will and of faults in linguistic expression match so closely the two definitions of magick bequeathed to us by Crowley? Namely: (1) â€˜the Science and Art of causing Change to occur in conformity with Willâ€™ (1913: 124); but also (2) his less-quoted definition of magick as â€˜a disease of languageâ€™ (1913: 185). What is this strange link in magick between the vulnerability of will and the inadequacy of language?
â€œDisease of languageâ€ is an expression taken by Crowley from Max MÃ¼llerâ€™s ideas on the formation of myths. MÃ¼ller asserted that myths were a linguistic corruption caused when abstract concepts become personified (1866: 12). Crowley describes â€“ for instance â€“ how Thoth was originally just a guy who invented writing (1913: 185), not the terrible ibis-headed deity that sprang into being after writing itself was personified. Yet the advantage of personification is the creation of a linguistic hook to assist further thought. Magick, like myth, Crowley suggests, is a linguistic process for bringing the abstract into manifestation through personification.
From this perspective, magick as â€˜Change in conformity with Willâ€™ is complementary, for when we will this too is a process of personification: we experience an impulse and then we own it and experience it as â€œoursâ€. Will is the personification of desire, because each time we say â€œIt is my will…â€, this is an identification with experience. Suddenly, a desire belongs to someone; it becomes what that someone wants. The act of willing brings into existence an entity every bit as mythological as Thoth: the I. For if the disease of language is personification, then every â€œIâ€, â€œmeâ€ and â€œmineâ€ is a symptom.
Given that magick consists in personification of or identification with desire, this creates the possibility of intentions that fulfil a desire which turns out not to be â€œoursâ€. In the case of Boffo and I, we both experienced headaches when we actually wanted to be free from them. A desire was fulfilled, but the identification with that desire was not. We got what we did not want because we identified a desire rather than identifying with it. We fell victim to language in its literal mode rather than the diseased form in which magick resides. Our language wasnâ€™t diseased enough to prevent what happened from fitting the intention. If our language had been diseased enough there would have been only what we wanted in the intention (because it would have been â€œoursâ€), and so what actually happened wouldnâ€™t have appeared to fit, and would have passed without notice.
In â€œThe Monkeyâ€™s Pawâ€, presumably Mr. White is identified with the desires he expresses in his three wishes. However, we have seen already that there is another desire in play, the desire of the fakir, which is namely that others shall realise their wants are ineffectual and that they are subject purely to fate. Anything Mr. White wishes for is therefore foiled from the outset. He cannot use language magically to personify his desire, because he himself is a personification within the diseased language of the fakir, a personification of the typical person who is incapable of realising his desire.
The only wish of Mr. Whiteâ€™s that is fulfilled is the wish to send back his son to the grave. As a personification, Mr. White’s desire to cease desiring is the only one that can be met, which is associated in the tale with wishing dead the one that he loves.
â€œThe Monkeyâ€™s Pawâ€ is a morality tale, a genre that relies on personification to transmit its message. At this level, the fakir is presumably a personification also â€“ but of what? A number of possibilities suggest themselves. Maybe he represents the Divine, as the ultimate source of all experience. On a more psychological level, maybe he is the unconscious. Or maybe he is language itself. In any case, he represents a force that alienates us from our desire. What the story seems to demonstrate is not that magick is necessarily evil, but that its efficacy â€“ and ours â€“ is undermined when we are barred from the process of expressing and exploring our own desire. When we cannot use diseased language to personify desire, we are trapped in a nightmarish world where what is said is literally what is, with no space for change.
The horror of â€œThe Monkeyâ€™s Pawâ€ is how we cease to be people and become personifications when our capacity to wish is taken away. Magick fails not when we wish for too much, but when we are prevented from engaging with our true desires.